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FOUR years after the death of T . S. El iot it is still not easy to assess that extraordinary and pervasive influence exercised on the literary mind of England, America and Europe 
over forty years by a sparse output of books and articles. T o be 
sure, the 'modernism' of El iot and Pound is no more an active 
movement in English poetry, but a phase of history; any revival 
since the war of modernist techniques and vers libre does not stem 
from that movement but represents a fresh exploration based on 
the study of the later Pound, Wil l iam Carlos Williams and Lowel l . 
A poet like Charles Tomlinson, clinging to a symbolist purity 
of structure and to the sophisticated long line and cadenced 
paragraph, is as interestingly out of place in the present genera-
tion as Henry Reed was in the previous one. The line of Eliot 's 
critical thought is always drawn close to the predilections of his 
poetry. But even i f we can look back on a finished achievement, 
in both his poetry and his criticism it is not one that lends itself 
easily to categories; to attempt to impose on it a theoretical 
pattern is to miss the whole tone of Eliot's mind, its fastidious 
sceptical touch and avoidance of premature dogmatic formula-
tions. He disarmingly admits inconsistencies (in The Music of 
Poetry, for instance), but, in not subscribing to any general 
aesthetic theory, holds that such self-denial is a prerequisite of 
any true literary perception, since 'a system almost inevitably 
requires slight distortions and omissions'. 1 
This essay is concerned not with extracting principles but with 
establishing the tone of Eliot's criticism. 'In my end is my 
beginning': it is necessary to go back to the germinal work, the 
essays collected in The Sacred Wood (1920), to find in a pure form 
the relation between what is said in his criticism and the authori-
tative personal tone; in this relation lies the secret of his compul-
sive success; to risk a generalization before coming to particular 
1 For Lancelot Andrewes, 1928, p . 58. 
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examples, one might say that the matter is that 'revaluation' within 
an accepted European pattern of reputations or concepts, which 
has subsequently become the stock method of literary inquiry in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, proliferating in thousands of articles. 
(The pace, of course, has now quickened: in 1966 The Times i n 
its weekend review revalued the classic reputations of a decade 
ago.) The point about the revaluation is that although the opinion 
advanced may be novel or even revolutionary, the terms in which 
it is offered are those of public persuasion towards a shift of 
values within a recognized system. Thus there is a shock effect 
combined of trenchant orthodoxy and striking unorthodoxy: 
an acceptance of the traditional pre-eminence of Homer and 
V i r g i l w i l l be found alongside the oblique disparagement of 
Mi l ton . T o describe it thus in terms of the effect on the reader 
may seem to be too hastily translating critical honesty and 
independence into purely rhetorical terms. However, the rhetorical 
element is important in these early essays. The quiet tone, precise 
but hedged with qualification, is the exact embodiment of the 
thought and a closer examination of it may lead us to look more 
closely at the thought (the emphatic precision where the very 
dryness is devastating extends even to the obiter dicta; one that I 
believe is genuine is a comment on the published progress of a 
certain theologian: 'If X ' s third book is to be half as good as his 
first, it w i l l have to be three times as good as his second'). 
The influence both inside and outside the universities was felt 
very rapidly, as M r George Watson has shown. 1 E l iot soon 
became the controlling mind behind both a distinctive school of 
criticism and the notable revival of criticism as such that has 
come about in our time. M r James Reeves has recorded that 
when he went up to Cambridge in 1928 he was handed two 
books, Poems 1909-192J and The Sacred Wood, very much as 'the 
stranger who enters an Anglican church at service time is handed 
two books, Hymns Ancient and Modern and The Book of Common 
Prayer'? 
In The Sacred Wood the ideas and style are already fully formed 
and the sense of speaking from an assured position is in the 
1 Critical Quarterly, v i r , n o . 4. W i n t e r , 1965, p p . 328-37. 
2 T . S. Eliot: A Symposium, c o m p i l e d by R i c h a r d M a r c h a n d T a m b h n u t t u , 1948 
p . 38. 
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young Eliot quite dauntingly middle-aged. Some critics, Coleridge 
for instance, give the sense of having begun an inquiry which has 
still a long way to run; the impression left by The Sacred Wood 
is that a completely honest and rigorous intellectual survey of 
the highest order has beeen carried out as it were off stage, and 
that what one is getting is not even a full report of the results, 
but simply the application of a few of the results, devastating!}-
and accurately, to certain current problems of literary value that 
have come in Idiot's way. The later essays do not develop this 
critical approach, and in them the stylistic impact is blurred 
rather than sharpened; they explain and extend certain features 
of the approach by moving further in the direction of an explicitly 
theological and sociological attitude to literature. 
A l l the great English critics have been poets seeking to justify 
their own practice in poetry (F. R. Leavis is the outstanding 
exception). El iot resembles Sidney, Dryden, Johnson and 
Wordsworth in this respect. T o put it like this is perhaps to 
suggest too much that one activity was secondary to the other, 
that the criticism was a programme and the poetry a demonstra-
t ion; better to sav that the young F'liot's interest in what might 
be done in English poetry and how the language might be 
freshly used was at once so intense and so self-conscious that he 
was compelled both to write poems himself and to say what he 
was doing by implication in comment on works that appeared 
to him strikingly helpful, technically related to his own work, 
or strikingly illustrative of methods that seemed to him no longer 
profitable. 
N o clearly defined principles emerge from these essays: the 
tone is dry, ironic and cagey, as if full-blown theorizing is for 
fools: 'Poetry is a superior amusement: I do not mean an amuse-
ment for superior people. I call it an amusement. . . because i f 
you call it anything else you are likely to call it something still 
more false'; 'the only cure for Romanticism is to analyse it ' . 
There are no key phrases like Wordsw rorth's 'the real language of 
men', no w rooing slogans like Arnold's 'the best that is known and 
thought in the world' . The manner is dry and reticent, and yet 
it is exciting because of a reserve of intellectual passion all the 
more impressive for being held back. A n d we feel that what is 
being held back is not so much a body of undeclared principles 
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as a bitterly acquired knowledge of the business of l iv ing, 
passion as well as intellect. It comes out in these words near the 
end of the essay 'Tradition and the Individual Talent': 'Poetry 
is not a turning loose of emotion but an escape from emotion; 
it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from per-
sonality. But, of course, only those who have personality and 
emotions know what it means to escape from these things.' 
This is the inverted stance of the dandy who is too seriously 
involved in life to play with big ideas or big attitudes. 
The impression gained from the tone predominates because in 
his handling of ideas E l iot is habitually cautious and evasive. 
In this he is the successor of Matthew Arnold , however tempera-
mentally opposed the two may be. He describes Arnold as more a 
propagandist for criticism than a critic; to both the critical 
intelligence is not merely worthwhile but indispensable. They 
share a common aim : the defence of the rigorous intellectual analy-
sis of artistic works in an England which is felt to be potentially 
hostile to such an approach. Philistinism in England is now quite 
dead and the cultural danger is the quite different one of skilful 
vulgarization with an eye to the market; but in 1920, sixty years 
after Arnold's fulminations, all the work was to do again. As 
Arnold had done, El iot too in his later work moved towards a 
broader interest in the problems of culture and society. Both look 
at English attitudes ironically from a standpoint slightly with-
drawn from English life. A r n o l d had taken the strain of the new 
learning of Europe in the early nineteenth century, German 
philosophy after Hegel and French positivism; he had made his 
pilgrimage to Paris. E l iot as a Europeanized American, more 
European than the Europeans, was prepared with his friend 
Ezra Pound, to lay siege to the literary capitals of the real Europe 
for the cause of an ideal Europe, a Europe of the mind. 
A critical bridgehead had to be established in the face of the 
literary world ; heterodox views had to be aired in such sacrosanct 
places as the review columns of the Times Literary Supplement. 
T o make use of the title of a volume of M r Leon Edel's life of 
I lenry James, they laid deliberate siege to London, and London 
fell in the end, and after it the whole Anglo-Saxon literary and 
academic establishment. There were of course pockets of indig-
nant resistance which remained to be mopped up at a late stage 
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of the campaign: Gav in Bone's donnish sneer at 'an American 
critic, a M r El iot ' was published as late as 1942. T o term Eliot 's 
revaluation of current assumptions a revolution is not just to 
employ a loose word for any kind of major change in our view 
of literature : the essays of The Sacred Wood as they were published 
in The Egoist and The Athenaeum between 1917 and 1920 represent 
a deliberate seizure of power by a minority using infiltration 
rather than direct attack in the manner that Lenin and the Bo l -
shevik leaders were using to seize power in the same years. Pound 
makes a remark in a letter which illustrates this sense of con-
spiracy; he is criticizing a rare failure of tone in an El iot review 
where he had abandoned his habitual insinuation for a bludgeon-
ing approach : 'That's not your style at all. Y o u let me throw the 
bricks through the front window. Y o u go in at the back door 
and take out the swag. ' 1 The characteristic insinuating tone can 
be seen in the careful dropping of certain names on the margin 
of the main arguments of the essays. The disparaging references 
to M i l t o n have become notorious, especially that to 'The Chinese 
wall ' of his blank verse. The favourable references to Stendhal 
and the extremely hostile ones to Meredith might also be 
mentioned : 
How astonishing it would be, if a man like Arnold had concerned him-
self with the art of the novel. . . had shown his contemporaries 
exactly why the author of Amos Barton is a more serious writer than 
Dickens, and why the author of La Chartreuse de Parme is more serious 
than either ? 
'The few people who talk intelligently about Stendhal and 
Flaubert and James' . . . 'the suspicion is in our breast that M r 
Whibley might admire George Meredith'. 'The Charles Louis 
Philippes of English Literature are never done with, because 
there is no one to k i l l their reputations; we still hear that George 
Meredith is a master of prose, or even a profound philosopher'. 
These allusions, like those to the value of the experiments carried 
out in prose by Conrad and Joyce, are peripheral to the discus-
sions of poetry which are the concern in the forefront of the 
essays. Faults and virtues are hinted at, but no full case, or even 
the suggestion of a critical case is made out; yet the allusions 
occur in the course of carefully reasoned arguments and therefore 
1 Letters ofEçra Pound, ed . D . D . Page , 1950. 
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draw to themselves from the main argument some of its force 
and weight of judgement. Arno ld had made the mistake, fatal in 
England, of arguing with his countrymen about religion before 
he had convinced them that his literary views were worth listening 
to; also he generalized too much, El iot made neither of these 
mistakes. Instead he carried out a series of small-scale intellectual 
reassessments of particular writers so well that readers could fill 
in the gaps between these new landmarks for themselves, as one 
joins up the dots in a child's drawing-book, so that a whole new 
orientation of English literary tradition began to appear. 
The stock assumptions which these reassessments were to 
undermine need not be summarized at length. They are lucidly 
analysed by M r C. K . Stead in The New Poetic (1964). It is worth 
noticing, however, that though they derive from one strand of 
the late Romantic tradition, Eliot 's critical thought follows on 
directly from another strand of the same tradition. Briefly, 
Eliot 's criticism is directed against three sacred, no longer argued 
presuppositions of late nineteenth-century poetic mythology: 
first, the idea that only the genius, the great man, matters, and 
that he is solitary, owing nothing to the community of his 
fellows (Eliot calls this 'the perpetual heresy of English cul-
ture'). A r n o l d had talked in the same way of the folly of despising 
criticism as an activity of a lower order and of neglecting the 
need for a free current of ideas; El iot follows Arnold's very 
phrasing closely, speaking of 'the rapid circulation of ideas'. 
He argues that we need second-order minds which are not the 
same as second-rate minds; the great man may be greater for a 
current of fresh ideas which only the second-order minds can 
maintain, and the poet who is less than great wi l l certainly 
profit from that current. Here again the revolution has been 
accomplished, not of course entirely on account of Eliot 's 
writings, but owing to impersonal pressures in our society and 
the advent of mass education. There is no lack now of second-
order minds and our public arrangements are geared to the 
production of a great many more. 
The second assumption, which is clearly linked with the first, 
is that the quality of a work of art is dependent on an unanalysable 
personal emotion which lies beyond intellectual discourse and 
which the beholder or audience shares with the artist. The third 
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assumption, which may seem superficially to be at odds with the 
second, is that poetry offers some form of uplift, consolation or 
philosophy or beautiful thoughts. A closer inspection wi l l show 
us that the last two ideas really complement each other. If the 
poem as poem cannot be analysed, the ideas and moral attitudes 
that are taken up into it are at least detachable and give the 
critic something to talk about. 
Eliot's criticism of all these presuppositions is that they draw 
the reader's attention away from the poetry itself to something 
else, the pleasant emotions generated in him by the poem, the 
interest of the personality he feels is being revealed to him, or 
some kind of ennobling statement about life which might range 
in value from a world-view to a Christmas-cracker motto. 
'Honest criticism is directed not upon the poet but upon the 
poetry.' A l l views are false which try to substitute something 
else for the poem. It is noticeable now that in arguing for the 
substantiality and indivisibility of poetry as a thing in itself E l iot 
is returning to the chief Romantic doctrine of poetic uniqueness 
in order to dismiss late aberrations of that doctrine. Thus on 
what I have crudely summarized as the second assumption to 
which he is hostile, his attitude is ambiguous: he holds with 
Coleridge and the Symbolists that the poem is an imaginative 
fusion reaching an effect that lies beyond personal associations 
and beyond the local or historical (lexical) meanings of words 
and phrases: 
For the ordinary emotional person, experiencing a work of art, has a 
mixed critical and creative reaction. It is made up of comment and 
opinion, and also of new emotions which are vaguely applied to his 
own life. The sentimental person, in whom a work of art arouses all 
sorts of emotions which have nothing to do with that work of art 
whatever, but are accidents of personal association, is an incomplete 
artist. In the artist these suggestions . . . become fused with a multitude 
of other suggestions . . . and result in the production of a new object 
which is no longer personal. 
The end of the enjoyment of poetry is a pure contemplation from 
which all the accidents of personal emotion are removed ; thus we aim 
to see the object as it really is . . . 
Here a view of the self-sufficiency of the art work which echoes 
symbolist theory is used to demolish the reliance of indefinable 
personal emotion derived from the same source. 
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In the first essays of The Sacred Wood E l iot describes 'The 
Perfect Critic ' and then various contemporary 'Imperfect Critics'. 
A l l the latter are interested in something other than the poem as 
unique and independent object. Swinburne has taste and en-
thusiasm but stops short of analysing the special qualities which 
attract him. George Wyndham is a romantic aristocrat, and his 
intelligence is not sufficiently disinterested. In Paul Elmer More 
and Irving Babbitt the moralist precedes the critic of poetry. 
The good critic, on the other hand, is purely disinterested; there 
are not many specimens of h i m : Aristotle is one; Rémy de 
Gourmont is another (Eliot shares Arnold's predisposition to 
accept that they order these matters better in France). 
The key words used in the passage characterizing the perfect 
critic are 'intelligence', 'feeling' and 'feelings', 'emotion', and 
'sensibility' (the latter less frequently). Combinations of these 
terms occur throughout the essays; they suggest that Eliot 's 
hidden theory of poetry is based on a theory of human perception. 
In real life from moment to moment feeling (sensuous perception) 
and thought (reflection on it) come together in the continuous 
stream of consciousness, so that the poet looking faithfully at 
his experience can never separate thought and feeling (together 
they form his sensibility); abstract thought comes later, after 
both the original experience and the fused thought resulting from 
it ; so does emotion, for in Eliot's usage emotion is something 
that plays later about experience, not a part of it like the im-
mediate feelings — it is both a luxury product and a stage on the 
road towards increasing indefiniteness. The followers of Hegel, 
for instance, 'have taken for granted that words have definite 
meanings, overlooking the tendency of words to become in-
definite emotions'. 
The classical severity of all this, the austere intellectual tone, 
is aimed at getting the critic away from emotions and per-
sonalities and abstract systems to the hard facts of real moments 
of perception. There is a paradox here: Eliot's intellectualism, 
his approval of the hard definite outline, as in the comedies of 
Ben Jonson or the novels of Stendhal, his distrust of the blurred 
emotion mediating between creation and the expression of per-
sonality which in his early period he detected in Meredith and 
3 
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was later to condemn in Lawrence, 1 is directed to a conception 
of literature which is not intellectualistic, but which envisages a 
'whole man' in whom thought, feeling and even muscular 
sensation may be blended; and in him also the final success of 
creation is not entirely under the control of the w i l l : the good 
poet who has struggled for years to refine his technique may yet 
be surprised at what he finds himself saying. As in his poems, 
'Mankind cannot bear very much reality', or ' Y o u know and do 
not know what it is to act and suffer'. 
Involuntary participation in a higher reality — this suggests 
the influence of Bradley, who also aspired to a form of thought 
which should be as direct as sensuous apprehension. Eliot 's 
doctoral dissertation, 'Experience and Objects of Knowledge 
in the Philosophy of F. LI. Bradley' was completed by 1916; 
H u g h Kenner and Kristian Smidt have drawn attention to 
Bradley as a more continuous influence than any poet who 
engaged Eliot 's active interest. For Bradley sentience is primary 
for the understanding of reality, but for a complete understanding 
it must be transmuted : 
. . . feeling and will must also be transmuted in this whole, into which 
thought has entered. Such a whole state would possess in a superior 
form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling; and in 
this whole all divisions would be healed up. It would be experience 
entire, containing all elements in harmony.2 
Eliot , like Bradley, can be elegantly dismissive of all facile 
solutions; he can combine scepticism about the possibility of 
human knowledge of reality with metaphysical depth in recogniz-
ing an ideal system behind appearances. L o n g before he asso-
ciated himself with Christian belief and practice he demonstrated 
a belief in some ultimate understanding of experience — 'the 
notion of some infinitely gentle, Infinitely suffering thing'. The 
notion of understanding is transferred from the discursive 
reason to the creative perception of the artist. It was the liberal 
1 T h e c h i e f i n d i c t m e n t o f L a w r e n c e is i n After Strange Gods (1934), p p . 58-61 . 
2 F . H . B r a d l e y , Appearance and Reality, 1893, p . 172, q u o t e d i n K r i s t i a n S m i d t , 
Poetry and Belief in the Work of T . S. Eliot, 1961, p. 163. A n o t h e r phrase o f B r a d l e y 
f r o m The Principles of Logic, 1883, ' a w a y o f t h i n k i n g i n w h i c h the w h o l e o f rea l i ty 
was a sys tem o f i ts differences i m m a n e n t i n each dif ference' , seems t o bear d i r e c t l y 
o n the t reatment o f m o m e n t s o f intense sensuous p e r c e p t i o n b o t h i n the ear ly p o e m s 
a n d the ear ly essays. 
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illusion, condemned at Harvard by Irving Babbitt, in Paris by 
Charles Maurras and Lasserre, that man could hope to under-
stand himself; his nature was discontinuous; thus the artist 
should cultivate impersonality to maintain the gap between 'the 
man who suffers and the mind which creates', and through the 
latter only understanding might come — but for others. 
Intellectual precision is placed at the service of the primitive, 
the involuntary, the discontinuous and the immediate. The only 
good lines in the 'dreary sequence' of Drayton's sonnets in 
Idea's Alirror occur when he talks in terms of actuality: 
Lastly, mine eyes amazedly have seen 
Essex' great fall; Tyrone his peace to gain; 
The quiet end of that long-living queen; 
The king's fair entry, and our peace with Spain. 
Salvation may be found through that 'bewildering minute', the 
contingent moment. Intelligence is not an abstract function set 
over against the senses and the emotions, but the effort of a 
sensibility to know itself. The passages in The Sacred Wood where 
the dry logic is relieved by a more emotive phrase are those that 
indicate the poet's power to look into the dark places of human 
life; such a phrase is ' looking into the Shadow' which evokes 
the difficulty of the life of reason. There may be in the phrase a 
mingled reminiscence of two titles of stories by Conrad — 
another explorer of the dimension of human life lying beyond 
the control of reason — The Shadow Tine and Heart of Darkness; 
the latter provides an outstanding case of the split between 
conscious, personal, civilized intention and that assertion of the 
dark side of his nature which teaches man more about himself : 
'Mistah Kur tz , he dead.' 
The fullest statement of Eliot 's view of the impersonal artist 
is found in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' which comes 
nearer than any of the other essays to a consistent formulation 
of ideas: 
Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, 
and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in 
the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indis-
pensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his 
twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a perception, not 
only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence: the historical 
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sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in
his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe
from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country
has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.
This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the
temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together, is what makes
a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer
most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his contemporaneity.
The passages on the fusion of thought and feeling declare that
only such 'felt thought' can do justice to the truth of individual
moments of experience; in a similar manner, the historical sense
which, though it is said to involve great labour, is clearly not the
same as historical learning, can achieve a knowledge of the time-
less through the understanding of particular historical moments.
Eliot's conception of tradition raises more difficulties than any
other aspect of his view of literature. It is possible to see how it
chimes in with his other ideas; it is especially helpful a a ballast
for his view of the poet. If the poet is likely to be hamstrung by
doctrinaire intentions, if even his attainment of greatness is a
matter of hit and miss in particular historical circumstances,
then it is necessary for the creator who must be so aware of
imperfection to have an external standard: the impersonal
artist takes his place in an impersonal order. It is equally easy to
see that Eliot's 'simultaneous order' is not some vast extension
of literary history at which literary historians can grind away
linking up everything with influences and derivations. This is an
aesthetic order. The past is altered by the present. By writing his
early poems Eliot proved what Victorian clerical editors and
others from Coleridge to Saintsbury had only amiably hinted, that
Donne was a better poet and more at the centre of seventeenth-
century tradition than had been generally accepted; at the same
time Eliot's poetic talent was being directed by Donne and
Laforgue. The difficulty begins when one starts to examine what
a modern poet must actually do to fulfil Eliot's prescription.
'Great labour' - he must certainly read a lot, but how much?
And what else must he do? What is the relation between the
practical and the intuitive in the programme?
How are the less educated poets going to manage? Must one
read Greek? The last essays in The Sacred Wood are on Blake and
Dante respectively. Blake was a hard case for Eliot, Dante the
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perfect case of a great poet profiting from tradition. It might be 
said that Dante's conception of an order, temporal and eternal, 
that he shared with V i r g i l and Statius as writers, comes nearer 
to Eliot's view than any other historical example. It might also 
be said that after forty years of Blake studies El iot might more 
easily have been able to see Blake as a figure in a tradition, but 
it would not have been the tradition: Blake remains an obstinate 
nut to crack. The lifemanship of Eliot's own highbrow reviewer's 
learning with its casual references to the mimes of Herondas 
(recently published) is enough to daunt the beginner: 'the poet 
who is aware of this wi l l be aware of great difficulties and respon-
sibilities.' Quite apart from the question of learning, the whole 
line of argument presumes that a high degree of self-conscious-
ness is an advantage or even a necessity for the poet. There are 
some poems written in the twenties and thirties in which the 
poet appears to be asking the question, 'What would Donne-
El iot do here?' Ronald Bottrall, even Empson at times, seem to 
be deflected from the experience of the poem in this manner. We 
may suspect that the mind of Europe has had much to answer 
for, including the scanty output of some original talents. 
The poet, E l iot says, must be aware of the main current, and 
this wi l l not flow through the most distinguished historical 
reputations; art does not improve, but the material available to 
the artist alters as there becomes more to look back on: 'Some-
one said : "The dead writers are remote from us because we know 
so much more than they d i d . " Precisely, and they are that which 
we know. ' It is not clear here whether El iot thinks the poet must 
always be in the position of having an increasingly large available 
past of thought and literature or whether this is a special crisis of 
the twentieth century. The latter seems more l ikely, 1 availability 
in a liberal, internationalized epoch in which cultural communica-
tion through both time and space has become highly organized 
and the 'imaginary museum' extended to all the arts. El iot does 
not take much account of how in other periods poets might have 
been able to work with much less self-consciousness about the 
past. T o be sure, he does show some recognition of this in the 
essay 'The Possibility of a Poetic Drama' where he discusses the 
1 C f . the reference to M a r i t a i n o n P icasso ' s ' fearful p rogress i n se l f -consc iousness ' 
in I he Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, 1933, p . 121. 
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value of a conventional form like the Elizabethan blank verse 
drama for the writer, especially the minor writer. If there is no 
tradition, he says here, we lose our hold on the present; i f there is 
no established form, the writer has to waste time and energy in 
hammering out a home-made form for himself. This kind of 
do-it-yourself carpentry is attributed to Wordsworth and Brown-
ing ; perhaps the limitations of Eliot 's knowledge of Romantic 
and nineteenth-century poetry betray him here: Wordsworth 
was making something new out of the eighteenth-century 
treatise poem and literary ballad, and i f the dramatic monologue 
was home-made by Browning, it was already a tradition by the 
time Pound wrote In Périgord and El iot himself w7rote Prufrock. 
El iot concludes that though the Elizabethan age was in all 
other fields 'crude, pedantic, loutish', in comparison with France 
or Italy, in the drama alone were subtlety, consciousness [we 
note the word] and even an intellectual power achieved. 'To 
have given into one's hands a crude form capable of indefinite 
refinement, and to be the person to see the possibilities — 
Shakespeare was very fortunate.' E l iot as always moves from the 
conception of literary judgement that would see a poet in terms 
of intrinsic quality to one in which he is seen profiting by intelli-
gence from the luck of a given situation. The next sentence is 
revealing in a melancholy way when one thinks of the author's 
subsequent career in the theatre: ' A n d it is perhaps the craving 
for some donnée which draws us on towards the present mirage 
of poetic drama.' 
In preaching the advantages of a dominant form El iot is 
thinking out afresh a position of Arno ld , how the age can help 
the writer, Sophicles or Shakespeare, who is without much book-
learning. But Arno ld would not have thought of finding the 
source of life and vitality in a literary form ; his point was that in 
the Elizabethan age 'society was, in the fullest measure, permeated 
by fresh thought, intelligent and alive'. El iot knew more of 
sixteenth-century thought and, as we know from 'Shakespeare 
and the Stoicism of Seneca', did not find it particularly fresh. 
As for the objection that his programme demands too much 
learning for the modern poet and wi l l end by turning him into a 
pedant, El iot finally evades a straight answer that would state 
what he expects the honest minor poet actually to do by declaring 
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'Some can absorb knowledge, the more tardy must sweet for it ' . 
Shakespeare, we are told, got more essential history from Plutach 
than he could have obtained from the whole British Museum 
Reading Room. So the nature of the consciousness of the past 
remains largely undefined, while what is being stressed is its 
value in taking the poet outside himself and so assisting him to 
depersonalize his art. Therefore the second section of 'Tradition 
and the Individual Talent' comes round again to discussing the 
impersonality of the artist. The good poet is not a more interest-
ing personality or a man who has more to say than others ; what 
marks him off is that his mind is a more finely-perfected medium 
into which all kinds of different feelings are free to enter into new 
combinations : 
. . . when a bit of finely filiated platinum is introduced into a chamber 
containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide. . . the two gases form 
sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only if the platinum is 
present; nevertheless the newly formed acid contains no trace of 
platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected ; has remained 
inert, neutral, and unchanged. The mind of the poet is the shred of 
platinum. It may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience 
of the man himself ; but the more perfect the artist the more completely 
separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which 
creates . . . 
The chemical analogy admirable conveys the dry antiseptic tone, 
what might be called the scientific precision of the early E l iot 
manner (though it is often distinct from a logically precise 
argument) i f he had not already classed scientists with stock-
brokers and politicians as 'the sort of emotional people who 
pride themselves on being unemotional'. 
Given the impersonality of the poet, there must be a binding 
agent other than emotion or personal intention to bring about the 
fusion of the various elements. This is the 'objective correlative'. 
The idea is developed in the essay 'Hamlet and his Problems' : 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a 
chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; 
such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory 
experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. 
This is anticipated in 'Tradition and Individual Talent', written 
several months earlier in 1919 than the Hamlet essay, where we 
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are told that the nightingale in Keate's ode acts as focus for a 
number of feelings some of which may have nothing to do with 
it. Thus one is driven to conclude that the concept of the objective 
correlative originates in order to fill the gap which has been 
there described between the mind that suffers and the mind that 
creates, to obviate the impression of a complete stasis, the 
impersonal artist frozen in the impersonal order of tradition. 
But i f the correlative is a set of objects, a situation or a chain of 
events, it still remains to be operated in some manner by the 
conscious mind : the dynamic of the creative process still retreats 
before the reader, and this is not surprising; not surprising in 
any attempt at a theory of poetry, but especially not in El iot , 
when he starts from the recognition of the equation between a 
partial, contingent individual contribution and a varying measure 
of sheer good luck. 
The example that El iot goes on to give of his impersonal, but 
fully focussed, poetic success is a passage from Tourneur's 
The Revenger's Tragedy: 
And now methinks I could e'en chide myself 
For doting on her beauty, though her death 
Shall be revenged after no common action. 
Does the silkworm expend her yellow labours 
For thee? For thee does she undo herself? 
Are lordships sold to maintain ladyships 
For the poor benefit of a bewildering minute ? 
Why does yon fellow falsify highways, 
And put his life between the judge's lips, 
To refine such a thing — keeps horse and men 
To beat their valours for her ? . . . 
It may be thought that his detailed exposition of this example is 
less convincing than the general idea of a focus or correlative, 
and does not wholly explain his choice of this particular passage : 
. . . there is a combination of positive and negative emotions : an 
intensely strong attraction toward beauty and an equally intense 
fascination by the ugliness which is contrasted with it and which 
destroys it. This balance of contrasted emotion is in the dramatic 
situation to which the speech is pertinent, but that situation alone is 
nadequate to it . . . the whole effect, the dominant tone, is due to the 
fact that a number of floating feelings, having an affinity to this 
emotion by no means superficially evident, have combined with it to 
give us a new art emotion . . . 
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In the dramatic situation of Vindice meditating over his mistress's 
skull it is surely to be expected that a range of feelings connected 
with the contradictions of sensual attraction, human vitality and 
the finality of death, w i l l be brought together. If Eliot's 'floating 
feelings' imply logically irrelevant thoughts that are somehow 
disciplined to the central emotion, it is difficult to agree in this 
context. In fact he appears to be describing his own poetry in a 
manner that almost convinces us we can read Tourneur like that. 
The blend of emotion here, sensuality and death, a sensibility 
equally fascinated by the beautiful and the ugly, is what we are 
familiar with from Eliot's own early poems (the very rhythms 
of this passage are echoed in the middle section of Gerontion, also 
published in 1920). It is the nature of the feelings combined, not 
the intensity which brings about the fusion, that El iot is saluting 
in Tourneur; in spite of his careful analysis there is a concealed 
standard of approval based on a personal affinity. 
The essays on particular poets, Jonson, Marlowe, Massinger in 
The Sacred Wood, and the subsequent ones in Elizabethan Essays, 
carry out the programme already discussed. Certain points 
and curves are plotted along the line of that subterranean, 
unhistorical tradition which is the true one for the poet. As with 
Arnold's 'touchstones', the plotting of the graph can be highly 
personal. The same intelligence and complete control of subject 
displayed in the poems and in the theoretical essays are applied 
to substantiating the practice of complexity. Hence the rehabilita-
tion of Donne and the Metaphysicals. 
Thus the reviewer's judgements, the hints, the comments on 
style, form and metre, valid as so many of them still seem and the 
basis for so much of our thinking about poetry, may be traced 
to an extremely personal and special epistemology. Great poetry 
is complex and impersonal, because the isolated moments making 
up contingent experience are complex structures of feelings in 
which perceiving subject and objective outer world merge in an 
impersonal order. 
The great achievement of these essays, not approached by 
earlier critics, even bv Johnson or Coleridge, is to define the 
individual quality of writers by close attention to the language of 
their poetry. Paradoxically, in spite of the impersonal programme, 
it is ' Jonson' or 'Massinger' that El iot seems to catch at for us, 
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not a rounded off single work. The poet creates language and is 
renewed by it. When El iot stabilized his own poetic style he 
became a less exciting critic. The Sacred Wood records the growth 
of a poet's mind. Language, form and metre have more life than 
the individual intention. The individual struggle with them can 
produce both despair and joy. Later in the Quartets E l iot is still 
meditating on language : the struggle with words wi l l be decided 
by a complex of cultural forces of which the poet cannot foresee 
the outcome, and the weariness and pessimism arising from this 
are described in East Coker: 
every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
For the thing one no longer has to say . . . And so each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling 
Undisciplined squads of emotion. 
But there is also the occasional happy reward of the poet, when 
the words come together and make a significant point on the line 
of tradition. Every such point, or poem, is an end for something, 
and a beginning for something and someone else: 
The end is where we start from. And every phrase 
The sentence that is right (where every word is at home, 
Taking its place to support the others, 
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious, 
A n easy commerce of the old and the new, 
The common word exact without vulgarity, 
The formal word precise but not pedantic, 
The complete consort dancing together 
Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning, 
Every poem an epitaph. 
